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Abstract
Demand-side load management is able to significantly improve the energy efficiency of smart grids. Since the
electricity production cost depends on the aggregate energy usage of multiple consumers, an important incentive
problem emerges: self-interested consumers want to increase their own utilities by consuming more than the socially
optimal amount of energy during peak hours since the increased cost is shared among the entire set of consumers. To
incentivize self-interested consumers to take the socially optimal scheduling actions, we design a new class of
protocols based on review strategies. These strategies work as follows: first, a review stage takes place in which a
statistical test is performed based on the daily prices of the previous billing cycle to determine whether or not the
other consumers schedule their electricity loads in a socially optimal way. If the test fails, the consumers trigger a
punishment phase in which, for a certain time, they adjust their energy scheduling in such a way that everybody in
the consumer set is punished due to an increased price. Using a carefully designed protocol based on such review
strategies, consumers then have incentives to take the socially optimal load scheduling to avoid entering this
punishment phase. We rigorously characterize the impact of deploying protocols based on review strategies on the
system’s as well as the users’ performance and determine the optimal design (optimal billing cycle, punishment
length, etc.) for various smart grid deployment scenarios. Even though this paper considers a simplified smart grid
model, our analysis provides important and useful insights for designing incentive-compatible demand-side
management schemes based on aggregate energy usage information in a variety of practical scenarios.
1 Introduction
Governments and relevant industries are making a sig-
nificant effort to develop next-generation energy grids
(“smart grid”) which meet new environmental require-
ments as well as increased usage demands [1]. To address
these challenges, demand-side management (DSM) tech-
niques for smart grids (see e.g., [1, 2]) were proposed as a
way to significantly save energy. In a typical configuration,
the energy producer (e.g., a utility company) periodi-
cally receives usage information from the smart meter
affiliated with consumers via a communication network.
The energy producer then manages the energy genera-
tion/purchase/transmission and bills the consumer based
on this usage information. To save energy, reduce cost,
and increase reliability, the energy producer can use for
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instance smart pricing to encourage consumers to transfer
peak-hour consumptions to off-peak hours [3].
In this paper, we focus on DSM which operates based
on the knowledge of aggregate information of real-time
energy usage of a set of consumers instead of each indi-
vidual consumer (see Fig. 1). The use of aggregate infor-
mation instead of individual consumers’ information may
be due to various reasons, e.g., high cost for large-scale
deployment of smart meters for individual houses. Specif-
ically, the utility company generates/purchases/transmits
electricity according to the real-time aggregate usage
information of a set of consumers and charges the con-
sumers for their electricity usage at a price proportional to
the cost due to energy generation/purchase/transmission.
Since the cost incurred in peak hours is higher than that in
off-peak hours, the price is higher if consumers schedule
more loads in peak hours. If consumers were cooperative,
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Fig. 1 Smart grid system based on aggregate usage information of a set of consumers
then such a pricing scheme would result in a socially opti-
mal load scheduling by the consumers, meaning that the
sum utility of consumers is maximized. However, the self-
interested nature of individual consumers imposes some
important challenges for the deployment of such solu-
tions. Because the consumers’ utilities (i.e., the benefit
from energy consumption minus the payment) depend on
other consumers’ scheduling actions, an energy consump-
tion game emerges: self-interested consumers may want
to consume more energy in peak hours while paying a
relatively lower cost since this cost is shared among all
the participating consumers. Therefore, a crucial problem
for such smart grid systems becomes how to incentivize
individual consumers to perform the socially optimal load
scheduling in order to maximize the overall grid perfor-
mance. In this paper, we augment existing DSM schemes
by proposing a novel technology which incentivizes con-
sumers to reduce their consumption in peak hours. This
technology is general and can be deployed in conjunction
with many DSM schemes proposed in smart grids based
on utility functions so that selfish consumers find it in
their self-interest to follow the DSM scheme.
We model participating consumers’ interactions as a
repeated game [4] in which the energy consumption game
is played repeatedly (e.g., every day). We assume that the
energy delivery system is deploying a protocol which is
designed by the utility company or a third party aiming to
maximize the system efficiency (i.e., the sum utility of the
consumers in this paper). Besides designing a smart pric-
ing scheme that is based on the aggregate usage pattern
of the consumers, this protocol designer also constructs
a protocol which recommends a set of scheduling actions
to consumers based on the past prices, which depend on
the history of all the consumers’ energy consumption and
scheduling. The protocol designer is only active during the
design stage of the protocol and it is passive at run time. In
implementing the protocol, the utility company observes
every day the (aggregate) energy consumption pattern of
the consumer set and based on this performs billing every
billing cycle. The consumers use the past prices to deter-
mine their future energy consumption scheduling actions
in a self-interested and completely decentralized manner.
Note that the protocol designer is passive at run time, and
hence, it cannot oblige the consumers to follow the rec-
ommended energy scheduling. The consumers will only
adopt the recommended consumption scheduling if it is in
their self-interest to do so, i.e., if they are better off follow-
ing the recommended protocol rather than deviating from
it. Such a protocol is called incentive-compatible (IC).
To ensure that the self-interested consumers will take
the recommended scheduling actions, a punishment
phase is incorporated in the recommendation of the pro-
tocol designer upon observing deviations. The protocol
designer designs review strategy-based protocol which
consist of two phases: the review phase and the punish-
ment phase. (Its operation is depicted in Fig. 2.) In the
review phases, the consumers are recommended to take
the socially optimal scheduling actions. At the end of
each review phase, a statistical test is performed (either
by the consumers or the utility company) on the prices
announced by the utility company. If the test fails (i.e.,
there is an evidence that some consumers did not follow
the recommendation), the system goes into a punishment
phase in which consumers perform for a certain time the
strongest punishment which can be imposed on a self-
interested consumer. The punishment is implemented by
the participating consumers using a different energy con-
sumption scheduling. In particular, upon a deviation, all
consumers shift more of their energy consumption to peak
hours and, hence, the prices for the next billing cycles will
be raised. Therefore, the consumer who deviated will be
punished by receiving a low utility.
There are two important points that are worth not-
ing. First, even though the consumers who did not
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Fig. 2 Operation of protocols based on review strategies
deviate will also receive low utilities due to the raised
prices, the protocol is designed in such a way that con-
sumers still want to carry out such a punishment. Second,
the utilities obtained by the consumers in the punish-
ment phase are lower than those in the review phase.
However, they are the same as in the scenario where
there was no review strategy protocol being deployed.
Therefore, the review strategy-based protocol is guar-
anteed to achieve better system performance than that
which can be obtained without deploying the proto-
col. Importantly, the protocol designer needs to care-
fully design the protocol such that this punishment does
not take place too frequently since it reduces all con-
sumers’ utilities. We rigorously characterize the perfor-
mance of deploying review strategies and determine the
optimal design (optimal billing cycle, punishment phase
length, etc.) for various smart grid deployment scenar-
ios. It is also important to note that the proposed review
strategy-based protocol can be deployed in conjunc-
tion with any DSM scheme besides the smart pricing
scheme which is used for illustration in this paper, which
may take into account find-grained load scheduling (e.g.,
hourly scheduling). The scheduling results of any DSM
scheduling schemes can serve as the input of our design
framework, and the output is the review strategy-based
protocol.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, related works are discussed. Section 3 models
the repeated energy consumption game and formulates
the design problem of the DSM with usage data aggrega-
tion. Section 4 formally introduces the proposed incentive
protocol based on review strategies. Section 5 determines
the optimal protocol parameters and evaluates its perfor-
mance. Section 6 provides simulation results. Section 7
concludes the paper.
2 Related works
Amain issue for the efficient deployment of smart grids is
the design of DSM [5]. A large body of literature assumes
the deployment of smart meters and designs smart pricing
schemes to encourage individual consumers to manage
their own loads (e.g., by shifting their energy consump-
tion from peak hours to off-peak hours). Among them,
real-time pricing (RTP) [6], time-of-use pricing (TOUP)
[7], and critical-peak pricing (CPP) [8] represent popular
options.
Recent works [3, 9–14] considered consumers’ discom-
fort costs and aimed to jointly minimize the consumers’
billing and discomfort costs, by assuming some utility
functions. These works can be classified into two cate-
gories. In the first category, consumers are assumed to
be price-taking, meaning that they do not consider how
their consumption will affect the prices. In this case,
the decision-making of a single foresighted consumer is
formulated as a stochastic control problem aiming to
maximize its long-term utility [11–13]. Alternatively, in
[15, 16], multiple myopic consumers aim to maximize
their utility, and their decisions are formulated as static
optimization problems among cooperative users.
The second category assumed that consumers are
myopic and price-anticipating, meaning that they take
into account how their consumption will affect the prices.
In this case, each consumer’s electricity usage affects the
other consumers’ billing costs. These works [3, 17, 18]
model the interaction emerging among myopic con-
sumers as one-shot games and studied the Nash equi-
librium (NE) of the emerging game. In this paper, we
also model the consumers as price-anticipating. However,
consumers interact with each other repeatedly and are
foresighted, thereby engaging in a repeated game. It is
well-known that the Nash equilibrium in one-shot games
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with myopic players is often inefficient. In this paper, we
design a novel class of incentive protocols based on review
strategies in order to achieve the socially optimal load
scheduling in smart grid systems. Prior work [19] also
studied DSM in a repeated game setting. However, that
work assumes that each individual consumer’s action can
be perfectly observed, while in this work, only the aggre-
gate scheduling of a set of participating consumers can be
observed with noise.
This paper adopts a similar pricing method as in [3]
where pricing is performed based on the aggregate usage
pattern of a set of consumers and consumers are charged
proportional to their total daily energy consumption. It
is argued in [3] that this proportional charging model
is consistent with the existing residential metering mod-
els. Nevertheless, our work can be used in conjunction
with a variety of existing DSM scheduling methods [6–8].
Augmenting these methods with our proposed incentive
protocols is especially important when consumers have
incentives to deviate from the optimal scheduling given by
a DSM scheme (e.g., when it is performed on the aggregate
energy usage information).
The approach proposed in this paper contributes to
both the smart grid and the game-theoretic literature ded-
icated to engineering applications. Review strategies have
been adopted in the principal-agent games with discount-
ing in [20] in economics, and such games differ signifi-
cantly from the smart grid deployment scenario consid-
ered in this paper. In [20], the game is played between only
two players (i.e., a principal and an agent). However, in the
considered smart grid scenario, there are multiple players
(i.e., a set of consumers) and their utilities exhibit negative
externalities.
Table 1 provides a comparison with existing works.
3 Systemmodel
3.1 Power system
We consider a smart grid system with multiple consumers
and one energy producer, e.g., a utility company. These
consumers receive electricity from the same aggregator
which distributes electricity to the consumers. Each con-
sumer is equipped with an energy consumption scheduler
(ECS) for scheduling the household energy consumption.
A smart meter is connected to the set of consumers from
which it collects and analyzes the energy consumption.
This smart meter gathers (almost) accurate readings auto-
matically, at requested time intervals, and relays them to
the utility company. Using this information, the aggre-
gator (utility company) can adjust its energy generation,
purchase, and transmission accordingly. The communi-
cation between the utility company and the consumers’
smart meters is done through the local area network
(LAN) by using appropriate communication protocols.
Let N denote the set of consumers that share the same
aggregator, where the number of consumers is N. Figure 1
illustrates the system model.
Time is discrete and each time slot represents 1 day.
Everyday, there are peak hours when consumers’ energy
consumption demand is high and off-peak hours when
consumers’ energy consumption demand is low. Never-
theless, our analysis can be easily extended to include
finer-grained demand intensities, e.g., hourly scheduling.
For consumer n ∈ N , we assume that its daily schedula-
ble demand does not change and is denoted by dn. We also
denote the schedulable demand vector of all consumers
in the set N by d. Consumers can schedule these por-
tions of loads in different hours within a day. Since we
consider only peak hours and off-peak hours, we write an
as the fraction of load that is scheduled in peak hours for
consumer n and 1 − an as the fraction of its load that is
scheduled in off-peak hours 1. Consumers prefer consum-
ing energy in peak hours to off-peak hours. For consumer
n, its energy consumption benefit per day is
bn (an) = B
(
bpeakandn + boff-peak (1 − an) dn
)
(1)
where bpeak > boff−peak > 0 and B(·) is a benefit function.
The utility company charges the consumers for their




which is set depending on the electricity usage in peak
hours and off-peak hours, where Dpeak = ∑n andn is
the total consumption in peak hours and Doff−peak =∑
n(1− an)dn is the total consumption in off-peak hours.
Clearly, Dpeak + Doff−peak = ∑n dn is the total usage of
all consumers. Let Cpeak(x) and Coff−peak(x) represent the
costs of generating and distributing x units of electricity
Table 1 Comparison with existing works
Price-taking or Myopic or Model Observe individual
price-anticipating foresighted or aggregate usage
[15, 16] Price-taking Myopic Optimization Individual
[3, 17, 18] Price-anticipating Myopic One-shot game Individual
[19] Price-anticipating Foresighted Repeated game Individual
This work Price-anticipating Foresighted Repeated game Aggregate
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by the energy source in peak hours and off-peak hours,




is set to be pro-











where κ is the revenue/cost ratio. If κ = 1, then the
billing system is budget-balanced and the utility company
charges the consumers only the generating/providing
energy costs for the utility (i.e., the utility company does
not make money and it serves simply as a benevolent
energy provider). If κ > 1, then the difference between the
total charges to the consumers and the total energy cost
represent the profit made by the utility company. In this
paper, the protocol designer is considered to be benev-
olent and represent the consumer’s interests rather than
maximizing the utility company’s profit. Thus, κ = 1 in
the subsequent analysis.
We make the following standard assumptions on the
benefit function and cost functions throughout this paper.
Assumption 1. (1) The benefit function B(x) is increas-
ing and concave in x. B(0) = 0. (2) The cost func-
tions Cpeak(x) and Coff−peak(x) are increasing and strictly
convex in x. Cpeak(0) = Coff−peak(0) and C′peak(x) ≥
C′off−peak(x),∀x ≥ 0.
Because the smart meter only periodically sends the
usage information to the utility company, monitoring the
usage pattern (Dpeak,Doff-peak) is imperfect due to the
monitoring noise. Hence, the price is also a noisy function
of (Dpeak,Doff-peak). In particular, we model this by adding




) = p (Dpeak,Doff−peak)+  (3)
where  is induced by the monitoring noise of the
usage pattern. Because we assume that the schedulable
demand vector d is fixed, the price p (Dpeak,Doff−peak)
only depends on the consumption scheduling actions a of
the consumers. Therefore, we alternatively write the price
p(a) as a function of the scheduling action profile p(a).
Note that p(a) is the expected price if a is taken and pˆ(a) is
the actual realized price if a is taken in the noisy environ-
ment. When consumers are making scheduling decisions,
only p(a) is important since consumers can only compute
the expected price but not the actual price which has not
been realized yet.
By taking both energy consumption benefit and pay-
ment into consideration, consumer n’s (expected) utility
can be written as 2
un (a) = bn(an) − p (a) dn. (4)
A billing cycle consists of L days. At the beginning of
each billing cycle, the consumers determine the consump-
tion scheduling actions for the next L days. At the end of
each billing cycle, the utility company posts bills as well as
the electricity price of the previous cycle. Using the pric-
ing information, the consumers are able to infer the aggre-
gate daily usage pattern in the last L days. However, since
the price does not perfectly reflect the aggregate usage
pattern due to the noise term, the consumers’ knowledge
of the aggregate usage pattern is imperfect.
3.2 Energy consumption game: stage game
The consumers’ energy consumption scheduling action
profile a determines the price at which the consumers
will be charged, thereby leading to the following non-
cooperative game G = 〈N ,A, {un(·)}n∈N 〉 among con-
sumers. The elements of this game are elaborated below:
• Players: consumers in the setN .
• Actions: each consumer n ∈ N selects its energy
consumption scheduling action an ∈ A =[ 0, 1], i.e.,
the fraction of its energy consumption in peak hours
3.
• Payoffs: the utility for consumer n is the benefit
obtained by the energy consumption minus the
payment to the utility company as in (4). By
separating consumer n’s action from other
consumers’ actions, the utility can also be written as
un (an;a−n) = bn (an) − p (an,a−n) dn (5)
where a−n, by convention, is the action profile of
consumers except consumer n.
Since consumers are self-interested, they will want to
selfishly maximize their own utilities. We use Nash equi-
librium as the solution concept of this energy consump-
tion game.
Definition 1 (NE). A Nash equilibrium action pro-









In NE, no agent can improve its own utility by uni-
laterally changing its own action. Theorem 1 proves the
existence of NE of the considered energy consumption
game.
Theorem 1. There exists at least one NE in the energy
consumption game.
Proof. We will show that energy consumption game is a
strictly concave N-person game. The existence of NE for
this type of games then directly results from [21].
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In order to show that the game is concave, consider any
consumer n. We need to show that the utility function
un(a) is strictly concave in an.We investigate the two parts
consisting the utility function separately as follows.
(1) By Assumption 1, we know that B(·) is a concave
function. It is then straightforward to see that bn(an)
is concave in an.
(2) Now consider the price term. We perform












Hence, the payment term is strictly convex in an.
In sum, un(a) is strictly concave in an. Thus, there exists
at least one NE in the energy consumption game.
It is well known that NE is often not efficient in terms
of Pareto-optimality. If an action profile is Pareto-optimal,
then no consumer can gain a higher utility without
decreasing at least one other consumer’s utility by using a
different action profile. We provide a formal definition as
follows.
Definition 2 (Pareto-optimal (PO)). An action profile a
is Pareto-optimal if there does not exist any other action
profile a˜ such that un
(a˜) ≥ un (a) ,∀n.
Even though a PO action profile aPO is superior to aNE,
consumers do not have incentives to automatically adopt
this action profile in the energy consumption game since
they are self-interested. This is because for any action pro-
file that is not a NE, there will always be some consumers
who want to schedule a different amount of energy con-
sumption in peak hours to increase their own utilities. In
order to provide incentives for the consumers to play the
PO action profile, in this paper, we will design a proto-
col that exploits the ongoing nature of consumers’ energy
consumption interactions. For notational simplicity, we
denote un
(aNE) as uNEn and un (aPO) as uPOn . Before we
proceed to that, we provide a simple example to illustrate
the difference between aNE,aPO, and the inefficiency of
aNE.
Example (Two consumers). Consider two consumers:
N = 2. Let κ = 1, bpeak = 2, boff−peak = 1, d1 = d2 = 1
and B(x) = x. The cost functions are simple quadratic
functions as in [22]: Cpeak(x) = x2,Coff−peak = 0.5x2. The
utility of consumer n is therefore un (a1, a2) = 1 + an −
0.5
[
(a1 + a2)2 + 0.5 (2 − a1 − a2)2
]
.
In this two-consumer game example, the unique sym-
metric NE action profile is aNE1 = aNE2 = 2/3. That is, both
consumers schedule 2/3 of their energy consumption in
peak hours and no one wants to unilaterally schedule a dif-
ferent amount since that will only reduce its own utility.
Thus, the corresponding utilities are uNE1 = uNE2 = 2/3.
However, the sum utility is maximized when both users
choose the action profile aPO1 = aPO2 = 0.5, which is
the unique symmetric PO action profile. The correspond-
ing utilities are uPO1 = uPO2 = 5/4. The sum utility
obtained when taking this action profile is 87.5% higher
than that by taking the NE action profile (i.e., 4/3), thereby
indicating the inefficiency of NE.
3.3 Repeated energy consumption game
In the repeated energy consumption game, consumers
play the energy consumption stage game repeatedly. At
the beginning of each billing cycle, the consumers deter-
mine the scheduling actions for this billing cycle based
on the previous energy consumption history. Specifically,
consumer n determines atn for t = mL+1,mL+2, . . . , (m+
1)L at the beginning of billing cycle L based on the prices
ptn, t = (m− 1)L+ 1, (m− 1)L+ 2, . . . ,mL of the previous
billing cycle. Alternatively, consumer n can also determine
amL+τn when day mL + τ comes. However, because con-
sumers do not obtain additional information about the
past energy consumption histories during one billing cycle
(i.e., prices are announced only at the end of each billing
cycle), these two methods are equivalent for analysis. In
this paper, we consider that consumers determine the
scheduling actions at the beginning of each billing cycle.
Consumers do not directly know the energy consumption
history of other consumers. They can only infer this his-
tory according to a public signal z ∈ Z . In this paper, the
public signal is binary, representing whether the statistical
test is passed or not. Based on this information, the con-
sumers take actions to maximize their long-term utilities,
which is defined as follows







That is, the long-term utility is the normalized sum of the
discounted expected stage utilities which are induced by
the strategy where the expectation is taken over the prob-
ability over different sequences of action profiles
{at}∞t=1.
Figure 3 illustrates the timeline of the system and the
decision flow of consumers.
3.4 Problem formulation
In this paper, we assume a benevolent designer (i.e., κ = 1)
who aims to design a protocol that maximizes the




Nevertheless, other performance criteria can also be used
in our framework. Formally, the designer wants to achieve
an action profile aPO that solves the optimization below:
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The first constraint requires that no consumer’s utility is
decreased by applying such a protocol than NE. The sec-
ond constraint requires the solution be Pareto-optimal.
To provide consumers with incentives to take this action
profile, the designer designs a protocol that exploits the
ongoing interactions of consumers. Let  denote a pro-
tocol and V () = ∑
n
E{un()} as the protocol efficiency
where E{un()} is the expected utility of consumer n if
all consumers follow the protocol  . The protocol design
problem is then formally presented as follows
maximize V ()
subjectto isincentivecompatible (9)
The constraint requires that all consumers have incentives
to follow the protocol  .
4 Protocol based on review strategies
A possible incentive compatible protocol is the grim-
trigger strategy [4] which uses the strongest punishment
that can be imposed upon deviation. In the trigger strat-
egy, following any point in time at which there is any
evidence that any consumer had deviated from any previ-
ous recommendation, the protocol designer recommends
that each consumer consumes afterwards a large amount
of energy in peak hours (i.e., revert to NE action pro-
file forever afterwards). In the two-consumer example, the
protocol designer recommends both consumers to take
the PO actions aPO1 = aPO2 = 0.5 in each billing cycle.
If there is a deviation, the protocol designer recommends
both consumers to take the NE actions aNE1 = aNE2 = 2/3
forever (i.e., all the way until the consumers unsubscribe
from this service). Therefore, the long-term utility that
consumer 1 can receive by following the recommendation
is uPO1 +
∑∞
t=1 δtuPOt , and the long-term utility by devia-
tion is ud1 +
∑∞
t=1 δtuNEt where ud1 > uPO1 is the one-shot
utility by deviation. Because uPO1 > uNE1 , the grim-trigger
strategy may provide sufficient incentives for the con-
sumers to play the PO actions. Since no users want to
deviate, the system never enters theNE equilibrium phase,
thereby leading to the highest social welfare. However, if
there is noise in the prices, the designer will determine
that some users have deviated by accident almost surely,
and hence, the system will eventually enter the punish-
ment phase with probability one and stay there indefi-
nitely. This leads to the lowest social welfare. Therefore,
a protocol which allows stopping the punishment after
a certain time is needed in such imperfect monitoring
scenarios.
4.1 Protocols based on review strategies
In a protocol based on review strategies, there are two
types of phases: review phases and punishment phases.
Each review phase consists of one billing cycle. Since the
length of the billing cycle is designed by the protocol
designer, the length of a review phase is a design param-
eter. Each punishment phase consists of a certain integer
number K of billing cycles, and hence, it has KL time
slots (i.e., days). The protocol designer recommends a
review strategy σR for all consumers as follows: the rec-
ommended scheduling action profile is aPO for each day
in the review phase; the recommended scheduling action
profile is aNE for each day in the punishment phase. At the
end of each billing cycle in the review phase, a statistical
test is performed (either by the consumers themselves or
the utility company) on the prices of the previous cycle to
determine whether other consumers followed or not the
recommended strategy. A signal z ∈ Z = {0, 1} is gener-
ated based on the test results with z = 1 representing that
all consumers followed the recommended strategy and
z = 0 representing that some consumers deviated from
the recommended strategy. If z = 1, the system moves to
another review phase; if z = 0, the system moves to the
punishment phase. When a punishment phase ends, the
system automatically moves to a new review phase. This is
the protocol based on review strategies depicted in Fig. 4.
Importantly, note that the utilities obtained by the
consumers in the punishment phase are lower than in
the review phase and they are the same as in the sce-
nario where there was no review strategy protocol being
deployed. Therefore, the review strategy-based protocol
is guaranteed to achieve better system performance than
that which can be obtained without deploying the proto-
col. However, the designer still needs to carefully design
the protocol such that the system enters the punishment
phase as rarely as possible.
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Fig. 4 Phase transitions in protocol based on review strategies
Given this review strategy structure, the protocol can be
fully characterized by the length of the review phase (i.e.,
the billing cycle length) L, the length of the punishment
phase KL and the statistical test G. Therefore, we write a
protocol based on review strategies as (L,K ,G).
In Table 2, we summarize what information the designer
and the consumers have and what computations that
they need to perform. Note that when performing appli-
ance level load scheduling, consumer takes into account
the specific electricity demands. However, since the pro-
tocol will be designed to be incentive-compatible, con-
sumers will perform scheduling according to aPO in the
review phases and according to aNE in the punishment
phases.
4.2 Performance metrics
To evaluate the protocols based on review strategies, we
need to define several performance metrics. First, the pro-
tocol should be IC since the consumers are self-interested
and will only follow recommendations when this is in their
self-interest. Particularly, consumers should have incen-
tives to take the PO scheduling actions in the review
phase.
Proposition 1. In a PO action profile, a self-interested
consumer will not want to schedule less than the recom-
mended energy consumption in peak hours in the stage
game.
Proof. If consumer n can increase its stage utility by
choosing adn < aPOn , then all other consumers’ utilities
are also increased because the price is reduced as the
aggregate usage in peak hours decreases. This causes a
contradiction to the definition of “Pareto-optimality”.
Proposition 1 states that, given the daily desired energy
demand of a consumer, if the designer recommends to
it the PO scheduling action, then the self-interested con-
sumer will schedule no less than the PO energy consump-
tion in peak hours in order to maximize its own utility
assuming other consumers are complying with the rec-
ommended PO scheduling. Note that this applies even in
the case when the consumer’s daily demand is low since
the consumer is simply re-scheduling its desired amount
of energy consumption to different hours. In the two-
consumer example, given the recommended PO action
profile a1 = a2 = 0.5, a consumer can only increase
its utility by scheduling more than half of its energy con-
sumption in peak hours to increase its own utility. There-
fore, we only need to focus on the case adn > aPOn when
considering consumers’ incentive problems and denote
the corresponding utility by udn for consumer n. Note that
consuming more energy in peak hours increases the price
and, hence, consumer n’s own payment is increased. How-
ever, because the costs are shared among the entire con-
sumer set, consumer n is still able to receive a higher utility
udn > uPOn by unilaterally increasing its own consumption
in peak hours when ∇nun
(aPO) > 0.
At the beginning of each billing cycle, the consumers
determine the scheduling actions for this billing cycle
based on the previous energy consumption history. We
will focus on constant strategies during a billing cycle,
i.e., consumer n chooses a constant scheduling action
every day during a billing cycle. However, our analysis can
also be extended to more sophisticated strategies (i.e., the
consumer may use different scheduling actions during a
billing cycle) by taking the equivalent average scheduling
action. Let Un
(
σR|s = 1) and Un (σR|s = 0) denote the
Table 2 Information and computation of protocol based on review strategies
The design stage
1. Each consumer reports dn and B(·) to designer.
2. Designer computes aPO and aNE.
3. Designer determines the protocol φ(L, K ,G).
4. Designer informs each consumer about aPO,aNE, p (aPO), and (L, K ,G).
The operation stage (each billing cyclem):
1. Each consumer performs its load schedule atn , ∀t = mL + 1, . . . , (m + 1)L.
2. Designer determines pˆt , ∀t = mL + 1, . . . , (m + 1)L based on the actual load schedule.
3. Each consumer is charged according to its load dn and the price pˆt , ∀t = mL + 1, . . . , (m + 1)L at the end of the current cycle.
4. The statistical test G is performed using pˆt , ∀t = mL + 1, . . . , (m + 1)L to determine which phase (review or punishment) the next
billing cycle is in.
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long-term utilities of consumer n at the beginning of a
review phase and a punishment phase, respectively, if all
consumers follow the strategy σ . Let σ˜Rn denote a strat-
egy where consumer n deviates to some adn > aPOn in
the current review phase and follow the review strategy
afterwards and all consumers follow σR all the time. The
following proposition characterizes the IC condition of a
protocol.
Proposition 2. A protocol based on a review strategy σR
is IC against a strategy σ˜n with the deviation action adn >
aPOn for consumer n if and only if
Un
(
σR|s = 1) ≥ Un (σ˜n|s = 1) (10)
Proof. This directly results from one-shot deviation
principle in repeated games [4].
Proposition 2 uses the one-shot deviation principle in
repeated games and shows that if a consumer cannot gain
by unilaterally deviating from the recommended strategy
σR in the current billing cycle and following afterwards, it
cannot gain by switching to any other strategies either and
vice versa. In the punishment phase, the recommended
strategy is the NE scheduling action profile aNE, and
hence, the consumers will not have incentives to deviate
from the recommended action. Therefore, we only need
to check whether the consumers have incentives to take
the recommended PO profile aPO, i.e., whether the one-
shot deviation principle holds in the review phase. The
left-hand side of (10) represents the long-term utility by
following σR, and the right-hand side represents the long-
term utility for consumer n by deviating to adn only in the
current review phase while all other consumers follow σR.
In Section 4.2, we will use Proposition 2 to construct IC
protocols based on review strategies.
The goal of the protocol designer is to maximize the
sum utility of all the users. The maximum sum utility
is achieved when all consumers take the PO scheduling
actions in each time slot, denoted by V ∗ = ∑n uPOn . We
call V ∗ the “first-best” utility which yields the maximum
sum utility for the consumers. The efficiency loss of a
protocol is defined by C() = (V ∗ − V ()) /V ∗.
Definition 3. A protocol  is said to be 
-Pareto opti-
mal (
-PO) if C() < 
.
A 
-PO protocol yields a sum utility no less than 1− 

of the first-best sum utility. If a protocol  prescribes the
scheduling action profile aPO every day regardless of the
history, then V () = V ∗ and thus  achieves the first-
best sum utility (0-PO). However, such a protocol is not
IC, and hence, the first-best is not achievable.
4.3 Statistical test
In this subsection, we discuss how the public signal based
on the prices is constructed. The consumers cannot know
the actual scheduling actions made by the other con-
sumers but can only observe the prices announced by the
utility company at the end of each billing cycle. Accord-
ing to (3), if all consumers take the recommended optimal
scheduling actions, the corresponding price on that day is
pˆ








)+Coff−peak (∑n (1−aPOn ) dn)∑
n dn
(11)
If there are some consumers who deviated by consum-
ingmore than the recommended amount of energy during
the peak hours, the price of that day is increased4. Due








The statistical test determines whether the consumer set
was following the recommended strategy in the previous
billing cycle by comparing the average value of the prices




















We are interested in the following two kinds of error
probabilities by performing the statistical test.
• False alarm probability qF(L, pth): the probability that
z = 0 when all consumers follow the recommended
strategy σR, i.e., they all scheduling the optimal
amount of energy consumption in peak hours.
• Miss detection probability qM,n(L, pth): the
probability that z = 1 when consumer n deviates to
the action adn in the previous billing cycle, i.e., it
schedules more than the optimal amount of energy
consumption in peak hours while all other consumers
take the optimal scheduling.
Note that our design can also be extended to analyze the
collusion problem where a subset of consumers colludes
in order to gain higher utilities. In that case, we can simply
take the consumers who collude as a single consumer with
its demand being the aggregate demand.
The following proposition characterizes the impact of
the threshold and the billing cycle length on the error
probabilities.





)− p (aPO)] , lim
L→∞
qF (L, pth) = 0 and limL→∞ qM,n (L, pth) = 0.
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Proof. By the law of large numbers, the sample averages
converge in probability and almost surely to the expected
value as the sample number tends to infinity. Therefore,
when the threshold is large than 0, the false alarm prob-




)− p (aPO), the miss detection probability goes
to 0.
Proposition 3 informs the protocol designer’s selection
of the statistical test (i.e., the test threshold). It also proves
that, in order to accurately detect self-interested con-
sumers’ excessive usage in peak hours, a longer billing
cycle should be chosen such that the monitoring mit-
igated. However, a very long billing cycle also reduces
the consumers’ valuation of utilities in the future billing
cycles, and hence, the punishment may not be strong
enough to induce consumers’ compliance. Therefore, the
optimal billing cycle as well as the punishment length
should be carefully designed to induce the optimal perfor-
mance of the smart grid system.
5 Design and performance analysis
In this section, we design the optimal incentive-
compatible protocols based on review strategies and ana-
lyze their performance. The outline of this section is as
follows.
• We first establish the existence of IC protocols based
on review strategies and provide the IC conditions
such that the consumers have incentives to perform
the recommended scheduling in the review phase.
• Next, we propose a greedy algorithm to determine
the optimal design of review strategies.
• We then evaluate the performance of the optimal
protocol based on review strategies. Specifically, the




Recall that Proposition 2 provides us with a simple
method to determine whether a protocol based on review
strategies can be IC. In this subsection, we study how to
design protocol parameters according to Proposition 2. To
do this, we need to compute Un(σR|s = 1), Un(σR|s = 0),
and Un(σ˜n|s = 1) where s = 1 denotes that the system is
in a review phase and s = 0 denotes that the system is in a





























The first term in (13) is the utility in the current review
phase. The second term is the continuation utility after the
review phase. With probability 1 − qF(L, pth) the system
remains in the review phase; with probability qF(L, pth),
the system moves to a punishment phase due to the
monitoring error. The utility of consumer n by choos-
ing a deviation scheduling action adn at the beginning of a
review phase is given by,
Un (σ˜n|s = 1)








+ (1 − qM,n (L, pth))Un (σR|s = 0)]
)
(15)
The first term in (15) is the utility gain by the deviation
in the current review phase which is larger than uPOn . The
second term is the continuation utility after the review
phase. With probability 1 − qM,n (L, pth) the deviation is
detected, so the system moves to a punishment phase;
with probability qM,n (L, pth) the system remains in the
review phase.
We define the following “incentive ratio” of a protocol
based on review strategies for consumer n:






Let us examine the physical meaning of this incentive
ratio. Essentially, the numerator represents the long-term
utility gain due to deviation, and the denominator repre-
sents the maximal long-term utility loss due to the pun-
ishment. To enforce consumers to cooperatively optimize
their energy consumption, this loss should be positive
and larger than the gain obtained when deviating. There-
fore, the incentive ratio should be in the range [ 0, 1]. It is
worth noting that gn(L, pth) should be strictly less than 1
since the denominator is only an upper bound on the loss
induced by the punishment but not the actual loss (which
depends on L,K , pth). Theorem 2 provides a condition
such that a protocol based on review strategy is IC against
a deviation action adn. This condition serves as a guideline
for the choices of the proper protocol parameters L,K , and
pth.
Theorem 2. The protocol  (L,K , pth) is IC against adn
for consumer n if and only if the billing cycle length satisfies
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0 ≤ gn(pth, L) and the punishment phase length is large
enough, i.e.
K ≥ 1L logδ(1 − gn(pth, L)) (17)
Proof. According to Proposition 2, we only need to
check the utility difference below,
Un
(
σR|s = 1)− Un (σ˜ |s = 1)











σR|s = 1)− Un (σR|s = 0)))













In the last equation of (1 − δL)(uPOn − udn) is the utility
gain in the current review phase billing cycle by deviation,
and the remaining term is the utility loss for the future
due to the punishment. For  to be IC, the utility loss due
to the punishment should exceed the utility gain due to
deviation, i.e.,(









The sufficient and necessary condition for the above to
hold is 0 ≤ gn (L, pth) < 1 and KL ≥ logδ
(
1 − gn (L, pth)
)
.
5.2 Optimal protocol parameters
We first determine the efficiency of a given protocol. If
a protocol is IC, then all consumers follow the recom-
mended strategy and play the PO action profile. There-
fore, the efficiency depends on the probability that the
system is in review phases and punishment phases due
to monitoring errors. Denote these two probabilities by
ηR() and ηP() = 1 − ηR(), respectively. The effi-
ciency of an IC protocol is thus V () = ∑n(uPOn ηR() +
uNEn ηP()) where ηR() is determined in the following
Lemma.
Lemma 1. ηR() = 11+KqF (pth,L)
Proof. Solving the stationary distribution of the Markov
chain in Fig. 6 yields the result. The transition probabili-
ties of the chain are R-R with probability 1 − qF , R-P with
qF , P-P and P-R with probability 1.
Lemma implies that in order to maximize the system
efficiency, the protocol designer should choose L,K , pth
such that KqF(L, pth) is minimized subject to IC condi-
tions in Theorem 2. These design parameters are coupled
in a complex manner, and thus, to find the optimal design
parameters, it is better to work backwards.
Step 1. We first determine the optimal K∗ (L, pth) given
L, pth. Therefore, the false alarm probability qF (L, pth)
and the miss detection probability qM,n (L, pth) are also
determined. If 0 ≤ gn(L, pth), the optimal K is chosen as







1 − gn (pth, L)
))⌉
(20)
Step 2. Given L, the statistical test determines qF(L, pth)
and qM,n(L, pth),∀n ∈ N . Note that K∗(L, pth) depends
on the statistical test through the term qF(L, pth) +
qM,n(L, pth). Therefore, the optimal statistical threshold is
chosen as
p∗th = argminpth K
∗ (L, pth) qF (L, pth) (21)
In general, the statistical test threshold pth has two
opposite effects on K∗ (L, pth) qF (L, pth). Minimizing
qF (L, pth) often leads to a large qM,n (L, pth), and hence,
qF (L, pth) + qM,n (L, pth) may also be large. This by
(16) induces a large K∗ (L, pth). Therefore, the proto-
col designer has to trade-off when selecting pth between
minimizing the false alarm probability qF(L, pth) and the
punishment phase length K∗ (L, pth).
Step 3. The previous two steps provide the optimal p∗th
and K∗(L, p∗th) given the review phase length L. However,
the space of L includes all positive integer numbers and is
infinite. In the following, we determine the upper bound
on L such that an IC protocol can be designed.














If (22) does not hold, then there must exist n ∈ N such
that gn(L, pth) > 1 which violates the IC condition in
Theorem 2. Therefore, for a protocol to be IC, (22) must
be satisfied.
Proposition 4 leads to a crucial trade-off of the review
phase length. On one hand, the protocol designer wants to
choose a longer review phase period L because it improves
the monitoring accuracy, and hence, there is a smaller
probability that the system goes into a punishment phase
due to monitoring errors. On the other hand, a longer
review increases the current gain of a consumer in the
review phase upon deviation while it reduces the future
Xu and van der Schaar EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing  (2015) 2015:51 Page 12 of 17
loss due to the punishment because of the discounting
of the future utility. This requires a stronger punishment
(longer punishment phase), and hence, it induces more
energy consumption in peak hours as the system stays
longer in the punishment phase. More importantly, if the
review phase is too long, then even the strongest pun-
ishment (i.e., a trigger strategy that prescribes to stay in
the punishment phase forever upon deviations) is not
able to provide the sufficient incentives for the consumers
to schedule the PO energy consumption in the current
review phase. Therefore, given consumers’ valuation of
the future utility (i.e., the discount factor δ) and the struc-
ture of the stage game (i.e., udn,uPOn ,uNEn ,∀n ∈ N ), there
is a maximum length of the review phase, and hence, the
billing cycle should not be too long. To make the protocol
IC, the protocol designer must choose a review phase no
longer than the upper bound determined in Proposition
4. The optimal review phase length L (i.e., billing cycle)








which have been determined in the pre-
vious two steps for a fixed L. Based on the above three
design steps, we propose a greedy algorithm (presented
in Table 2) to determine the optimal protocols based on
review strategies which requires only finite iterations on
L. If the candidate threshold pth belongs to a continuous
interval, then we need to quantize pth to solve (19) in finite
iterations, and hence, the algorithm leads to a sub-optimal
protocol.
5.3 Performance evaluation
In the previous subsection, we determine the optimal
protocol design. In this subsection, we characterize the
performance of these optimal protocols. Specifically, we
are interested in determining whether a protocol based on
review strategies  can be 
-PO.
Recall that the first-best efficiency is V ∗ = ∑n uPOn , and
the sum utility of a given IC protocol can be determined
using the result in Proposition 3. Therefore, if ηR() is
close enough to 1, then (V ()−V ∗)/V ∗ can be made less
than a given 
. According to Proposition 3, this can be
done if qF is close enough to 0 and if K is finite. That is,
an accurate enough statistical test is required. By Propo-
sition 4, if L is long enough, then the monitoring can
be accurate enough. However, a long L can be chosen
only when the consumers valuate the future utilities suffi-
ciently high enough. The following theorem characterizes
the condition when a protocol is 
-PO.
Theorem 3. ∀pth ∈
[
0, pdn − pPOn
]
, for a given 
 ∈[ 0, 1],
there exists δmin ∈ (0, 1), such that ∀δ ≥ δmin there exists a
protocol (L,K , pth) such that it is 
-PO.
Proof. Let us write 
-PO condition in terms of ηR and




n∈N uPOn + (1 − ηR)
∑
n∈N uNEn
≥ (1 − 
)∑n∈N uPOn




uPOn −uNEn  A
⇒ qF(L, pth) ≤ 1−AKA
(24)
Note that 
 ∈ (0, 1) → A ∈ (0, 1), 
 = 0 → A = 1, and

 = 1 → A = 0.
Fix pth = p¯th ∈[ 0, pdn − pPO] and







Now, we select L = L¯ such that
qF(L¯, p¯th) ≤ 1 − AKA (26)
Such L¯ exists due to the law of large numbers (see Propo-
sition 3).
(L¯, K¯ , p¯th) is a 
-PO protocol by the above construc-
tion. Now, we show that it is also IC for δ close enough
to 1. The condition under which (L¯, K¯ , p¯th) is an IC
protocol is:
1 − δL¯
1 − δL¯K¯ ≤ δ
L¯ (1 − qF − qM,n) uPOn − uNEnudn − uPOn ,∀n ∈ N
(27)






This implies that there exists a δmin close to 1 such that for
every δ ≥ δmin the above inequality defines an IC protocol
(the inequality must be strict). Since (28) is exactly that
same as (25), the constructed protocol (L¯, K¯ , p¯th) is IC
for δ ≥ δmin.
Theorem 3 characterizes the asymptotical performance
of the protocols based on review strategies. Specifically,
when the consumers highly value their future utilities,
then the protocol designer can design a protocol based
on review strategies whose sum utility is close enough
to the first-best. That is, consumers will comply with the
recommended scheduling most of the time.
Corollary 1. If δ → 1, then the efficiency loss of the
optimal protocol goes to 0.
The corollary states that if the consumers do not dis-
count their future utilities, then the protocol designer can
design a review strategy-based protocol which is IC and
also asymptotically achieves the full efficiency.
Remark: Our analysis depends on the deviation strategy
ad. To compute adn, we consider the unilateral deviation
by consumer n at the optimal action profile aOPT, i.e.,
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. In this way, a con-
sumer chooses to deviate to the action that maximizes its
own utility. However, if the consumer is “smarter”, it can
deviate to a slightly lower action than a∗n to avoid being
detected but still gains some increased utility (of course,
since there is noise, the probability of being detected is
higher if its selected action is closer to adn). Hence, a more
practical way to set adn is by setting a maximal tolerable
deviation action adn = (1 + γ )aOPTn where γ < 1 depends
on the maximal tolerable social welfare loss. Since, by
doing this the (one-shot) social welfare loss is at most
un
(aOPTn )−un ((1 + γ )aOPT), the designer can determine
γ according to the maximal tolerable social welfare loss
and set adn accordingly.
6 Simulations
In this section, we present numerical results and assess
the performance of our proposed framework. For illustra-
tion purposes, we assume that the benefit function takes
the linear form Bn(an) = bpeakandn + boff-peak(1 − an)dn,
the cost functions have the quadratic forms [3] Cpeak(x) =
cpx2, Coff-peak(x) = 0.5cpx2. We regard cp as parame-
ter determined by the power generation technology and
the power market and will investigate their impact of the
protocol design and performance.
Figure 5 shows how the optimal design of the billing
cycle varies depending on consumers’ valuation of future
utilities (reflected by the discount factor δ). On one hand,
a longer billing cycle improves the monitoring accuracy,
and therefore, the system has a smaller probability to
go into the punishment phase. Hence, the efficiency is
increasing in the billing cycle. On the other hand, a too
long billing cycle reduces the consumers’ valuation of
future utilities and, beyond some point, it violates the
consumers’ incentives to comply. Moreover, the optimal
billing cycle depends on how much the consumers value
the future utilities which is parameterized by the discount
factor δ. When δ is large, consumers value more their
future utilities, and hence, a longer billing cycle can be
used.
Figures 6 and 7 show the impact of environment param-
eters (the consumer set size and cost function) on the
performance of the proposed protocols. In Fig. 8, we
investigate the impact of the consumer set size on the
performance of our proposed protocols. As the number
of consumer increases, the protocol is able to provide
sufficient incentives for consumers to follow the recom-
mended optimal energy scheduling actions, and therefore,
an improved performance is attained. Fig. 9 varies the
cost function parameter c1 in peak hours and illustrates
the corresponding efficiency for the optimal protocol and
two protocols with fixed design parameters. As the cost
in peak hours increases, the efficiency decreases. The sys-
tem efficiency of the optimal protocol is 80 to 250% higher
than that when no incentive protocols are deployed. The
optimal protocol also outperforms the fixed protocols
by 50% on average. This highlights that designing the
optimal protocol could bring significant improvement on
the system efficiency. Varying the cost functions repre-
sents different utility functions for the consumers. Note
that different optimal scheduling schemes are required
for these different utilities, and hence, these simulations
Fig. 5 Optimal billing cycle length (review phase length). (N = 8, δ = 0.95, cp = 0.2, dn = 1, pth = 0.5, bpeak = 2, boff-peak = 1)
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Fig. 6 Impact of the consumer set size on the protocol performance. (δ = 0.85, cp = 0.2, dn = 1, pth = 0.5, bpeak = 2, boff-peak = 1)
also highlight the capability of the proposed framework to
design review strategy-based protocols which are applica-
ble to a variety of DSM schemes.
In Fig. 8, we consider a set of eight consumers with
various load demands. The first subplot illustrates the
consumers’ energy consumption scheduling actions with
and without the proposed protocol deployment. With the
deployment of the protocol, consumers tend to consume
less energy in peak hours. At the same time, their indi-
vidual utilities are increased as illustrated in the second
subplot. This is because the energy cost is smaller, and
hence, the bills charged to consumers are smaller. The
third subplot further shows the prices with respect to vari-
ous discount factors. Note that the price is proportional to
the energy cost. Therefore, the lower the price is, the more
energy-efficient the system is. When the consumers value
more the future utilities (i.e., the discount factor is larger),
consumers tend to schedule less energy consumption in
peak hours, and therefore, the price is also lower.
Figure 9 illustrates a real-time curve of the prices for
the considered set of consumers. Note that the price also
reflects the energy generation and transmission cost of
this consumer set. The energy price is low in the review
phase since consumers schedule less power in peak hours.
Fig. 7 Impact of the cost functions on the protocol performance. (N = 8, δ = 0.99, cp = 0.2, d = 1, pth = 0.5, bpeak = 2, boff-peak = 1)
Xu and van der Schaar EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing  (2015) 2015:51 Page 15 of 17
Fig. 8 Daily energy scheduling for each consumer with and without protocol deployment.
(δ = 0.95, cp = 1, bpeak = 8, boff-peak = 6, dn = 1, pth = 0.5)
Due to the imperfect monitoring, if the average price
of the previous billing cycle exceeds the predetermined
threshold, the system goes into the punishment phase. In
the punishment phase, the energy price is high because
consumers schedule more consumption in peak hours.
When the punishment phase ends, the system automati-
cally goes back to a new review phase and the price drops
again.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we augment existing DSM schemes using
aggregate usage information of a set of participating con-
sumers by proposing a novel framework which incen-
tivizes consumers to reduce their consumption in peak
hours. The proposed technology is review strategy-based
protocols. It is general and can be deployed in con-
junction with any DSM schemes proposed in smart
grids to make it incentive-compatible (i.e., selfish con-
sumers find it in their self-interest to follow it). The
proposed protocols are simple, and thus, they are suitable
for practical implementation in smart grids where the
energy scheduling actions cannot be perfectly monitored.
Even though this paper considers a simplified smart grid
model, our analysis provides important and useful insights
for designing incentive-compatible demand-side manage-
ment schemes based on aggregate energy usage informa-
tion in a variety of practical scenarios.
The success of DSM relies heavily on the energy pro-
ducer’s knowledge of individual consumers’ energy usage
information. However, a huge concern is that smart
meters threaten consumers’ privacy as data mining tech-
niques are applied to energy consumption traces in order
to infer consumers’ habits and behaviors [2, 23, 24].
This information may be used for other purposes besides
improving the efficiency of smart grids, thereby giving
rise to privacy concerns [25]. To respond to these con-
cerns, in 2010, California’s new smart meter privacy law
[26] was adopted, which mandates privacy protection for
the consumers’ energy consumption data. The proposed
scheme does not require detailed knowledge of household
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Fig. 9 Real-time energy prices with protocol deployment. (N = 5, δ = 0.95, cp = 1, bpeak = 2, boff-peak = 1, dn = 1, pth = 0.5)
electricity demand profiles at the appliance level or for
a fine time granularity. Instead, it only needs the aggre-
gate usage pattern of individual consumers at large time
scales, e.g., the aggregate usage in peak hours of a day
and the aggregate usage in off-peak hours of a day. This
information is very limited for the detection of the actual
consumption traces of individual consumers, and hence,
we believe that the proposed scheme can be applied in a
wide range of practical deployment scenarios.
Endnotes
1 The proposed protocol can also be extended to
directly recommend per-appliance scheduling actions.
However, such an extension would only complicate the
notation and presentation of the proposed methods
while the proposed methods will remain unchanged.
2 In practice, the utility function may dynamically
change over time. In this paper, we make the common
assumption that the utility function is fixed. One way to
handle the dynamically changing utility functions is by
periodically updating the design of the proposed protocol
to adapt to the changes.
3 The proposed method allows both continuous and
discrete value space of actions. For illustration purpose,
we consider only continuous value space in this paper.
4 If consumers consume less than the recommended
amount of energy in peak hours, the price is reduced.
Since self-interested consumers only have incentives to
deviate to a higher consumption in peak hours (by
Proposition 1), we do not regard consuming less in peak
hours as a deviation.
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